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the statute applied to this case. That paragraph stipulates that the EPA must
determine there were no other reasonable alternatives other than on-site disposal of materials. However, the Court held that there was no evidence in the
record, nor in the regulations, to support the claim that paragraph (c) applied
to this proceeding.
Second, the AEWC argued the evidence did not support a finding that discharges other than non-contact cooling water will not cause an "unreasonable
degradation of the marine environment." The AEWC's challenge of the EPA's
evidentiary analysis was based on two CWA criteria: (i) the potential impact the
discharge will have on human health; and (ii) "[sluch other factors relating to
the effects of the discharge as may be appropriate."
The Court disagreed with the AEWC, holding that the record was "replete
with evidence" that the EPA fully considered the AEWC's concerns and that it
considered the CWA's criteria in making its determination. Therefore, the
Court held that the EPA was not arbitrary or capricious in issuing the Permit.
Third, the AEWC argued that the EPA did not provide a rational explanation of how the EPA's monitoring program would prevent conflict with subsistence use and that the EPA acted arbitrary and irrational in relying on such monitoring programs. Again, the Court disagreed with the AEWC. It found that
the detailed description of the monitoring program included requirements for
monthly monitoring, post-drilling reports, and ongoing monitoring of marine
mammal deflection during discharges. Based on these requirements, the Court
held there was no basis for concluding that the EPA's design and implementation of the monitoring program was arbitrary or capricious.
Finally, the AEWC contended that the EPA should adopt the same nitigation measures that the National Marine Fisheries Services ("NMFS") adopted.
These are the same measures the AEWC, Shell Gulf Oil of Mexico, and Shell
Offshore, Inc. agreed to in a separate Conflict Avoidance Agreement. The
Court held that the EPA was not required to adopt those terms because the
AEWC identified no legal authority requiring such measures. The Court found
no measures that would mandate the EPA to incorporate the NMFS mitigation
measure or the Conflict Avoidance Agreement into the Permit.
Accordingly, the Court remanded to the EPA for a determination of
whether the discharge of non-contact cooling water would cause an "unreasonable degradation of the marine environment," and denied the petition in all
other respects.
Vann A. Ellerbruch
Alaska Wilderness League v.Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court's ruling that: (i) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement's approval of the challenged oil spill response plans was not arbitrary and capricious; (ii) the Endangered Species Act did not require the Bureau
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to consult with any enviromnental
agencies before approving oil spill response plans; (iii) the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement was entitled to Chevron deference for its interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act; and (iv) the National Environmental Policy Act
did not require the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to do an
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environmental impact statement before approving an oil spill response plan).
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") outlines the procedure for exploration and development of oil and gas resources offshore. This
process has four stages. First, the Secretary of Interior creates a five-year leasing
program under which operators may search and mine for oil and gas. Second,
the Secretary must approve the leases under agreed upon terms and conditions.
Third, the lessee must provide the Secretary with a plan of exploration and an
Oil Spill Response Plan ("OSRP") pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
Fourth, after searching for oil and gas, and successfully finding either, the lessee
has must submit a production and development plan to the Secretary for approval.
At the third stage, the Secretary of the Interior has delegated its power to
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement ("BSEE") to approve
OSRPs to prevent and respond to oil spills. The CWA requires these plans at
four levels: national, regional, local, and individual. At the individual level, owners and operators must propose an OSRP for approval that outlines their response to a potential "worst case discharge" of oil or some other hazardous
substance.
Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. and Shell Offshore Inc. (collectively "Shell") acquired three leases for offshore exploration and production-two leases in the
Beaufort in 2005 and 2007, and one in the Chukchi Seas in 2008. Shell complied with all regulations at the time for intended exploration, but due to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, the Secretary of the Interior placed a temporary moratorium on all offshore drilling. The United States Department of
Interior required owners and operators to provide new information in all
OSRPs after the moratorium ended. To comply with the new criteria, Shell
updated its OSRPs for its three leases. BSEE approved the updated Beaufort
and Chukchi Seas OSRPs.
Alaska Wilderness League, a coalition of environmental groups, sued Secretary of Interior, SallyJewell, in her official capacity because of the approval of
Shell's three OSRPs. Shell intervened as a co-defendant. On cross-motions
for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of
Alaska ("district court") ruled in favor of Jewell and Shell. Alaska Wilderness
League appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
("Court"). The Court reviewed the granting of summary judgment de novo and
reviewed the record of the agency's action under the arbitrary and capricious
standard.
First, Alaska Wilderness League argued BSEE's approval of the OSRPs
was arbitrary and capricious because Shell assumed it would be able to recover
ninety to ninety-five percent of any oil spilled in either of the seas via mechanical
means. A figure that Alaska Wilderness League claimed was unrealistic and
that Shell failed to support with any evidence. First, the Court found that Shell
could store, not recover, ninety to ninety-five percent of any spilled oil. Further,
the Court found that BSEE did not rely on this information i approving Shell's
OSRPs. Accordingly, the Court concluded BSEE's approval of the OSRPs was
not arbitrary and capricious.
The Court next addressed Alaska Wilderness League's argument that
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BSEE failed to consult with other agencies in order to comply with the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). The Court disagreed, reasoning that ESA only triggers consultation when the agency's involvement is discretionary, and, in this
case, BSEE's approval of the OSRPs was non-discretionary. Therefore, the
Court held that ESA did not require BSEE to do a consultation.
The Court then applied the two-step Chevron deference analysis to assess
BSEE's interpretation of the applicable sections of the CWA. At step one of
its Chevron analysis, whether the statute in question is ambiguous, the Court
found that the CWA was ambiguous in both its structure and its language. The
Court found the CWA has ambiguous language because of three pertinent sections: (i) 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) requires an operator to "prepare and submit.., a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst
case discharge;". (ii) § 1321 (j)(5)(D) lists six requirements that the OSRP "shall"
meet; and (iii) § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii) states that if the OSRP meets all six requirements, then BSEE "shall" approve it.
Specifically, the Court found the text ambiguous as to whether BSEE has
the discretion to consider any additional environmental factors in making its
determination of an OSRP. The Court found that the "maximumn extent practicable" language in § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) suggested the agency had discretion in its
approval of an OSRP. However, the Court also found §§ 1321(j)(5)(D) and
1321(j)(5)(E)(iii) to be a laundry list of requirements that an OSRP must meet.
If an OSRP meets those requirements, then BSEE must approve the plan; removing any agency discretion. Additionally, the Court found the statute's structure ambiguous because of the discretionary language in one section, and the
rigid language in the one following it. The Court found this difference created
C"a statute whose halves do not correspond to each other - giving rise to ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference." Under this finding of ambiguity, the
Court found it must defer to BSEE's interpretation of the statute as long as its
interpretation is reasonable.
The Court then underwent the second step of the Chevron analysis to detennine whether BSEE's interpretation was reasonable. Courts must defer to
an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute as long as that interpretation
is reasonable. BSEE argued that § 1321(j) (5) (A)(i) mandated it to promulgate
regulations that help operators follow the OSRP requirements listed in §
1321(j)(5) (D). Then, separately, § 1321(j)(5)(D)-(E) lists exactly what the OSRP
shall include and the agency shall approve. The Court agreed with BSEE's
interpretation that the statute mandated the agency to publish regulations to
outline how operators can comply with the list. The Court also agreed with
BSEE's interpretation that it could not consider anything more than the list
when granting an OSRP. Having found BSEE's interpretation to be reasonable,
the Court deferred to the agency's interpretation.
The Court also found that BSEE's interpretation was consistent with
longstanding agency policy. The Court explained how BSEE has a history of
regulating in conformity with the goals of the Oil Pollution Act that amended
the CWA. The legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act suggests that Congress meant to create specific requirements of OSRPs, not guidelines open to
interpretation by the courts or agencies.
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Additionally, the Court addressed Alaska Wilderness League's four additional arguments. First, Alaska Wilderness League argued that the similarity in
language between the requirements listed in § 1321(j)(5)(E) and the section of
the statute governing federal response plans to spills subjected the approval of
OSRPs to ESA consultation. However, the Court disagreed with this interpretation. Under the sections of the statute governing federal response plans, an
ESA recommendation may prompt agency action, but the plan "shall include,
but not be limited to" a number of factors. This federal response plan requirement, unlike that in § 1321 (j)(5)(E), does not limit the factors to those listed.
Second, Alaska Wilderness League argued that the regulations contain no
language to support approval of the OSRPs just because they address the cleanup plan to some degree. The Court quickly dismissed this argument. The
Court found that the statute states that the purpose of the OSRP is to prepare a
response plan for an accident at sea resulting in release of oil, and that Congress
ordered these plans be in compliance with "the Oil Pollution Act's amendiments
to the Clean Water Act." The Court deferred to BSEE's interpretation that the
OSRPs were sufficient and justly approved, despite any explicit language governing BSEE's decision.
Third, Alaska Wilderness League argued that BSEE had discretion over
whether OSRPs met the criteria in § 1321(j)(5)(E), thus triggering ESA consultation. The Court found this argument to be at odds with previous Supreme
Court's rulings. The Supreme Court previously held that "ESA cannot defeat
an agency's nondiscretionary statutory directive." The Court held that BSEE's
act of granting OSRPs was nondiscretionary, and so it did not trigger any interagency review under ESA.
Lastly, Alaska Wilderness League claimed that BSEE violated the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") by failing to do an environmental impact
statement ("EIS") before approving the OSRPs. Under NEPA, all federal agencies must conduct an EIS before conducting any "major Federal action" that
significantly affects the environment. However, the Court noted that there is an
exception to this requirement when the environmental impact is the result of a
decision over which the agency had no discretion. The Court ruled that because
BSEE had no discretion over the approval of the OSRPs under the statute, it
also had no discretion over the environmental impacts, making BSEE exempt
from performing an EIS.
Accordingly, the Court affinned the district court's ruling.
D.W. Nelson, Senior CircuitJudge, dissenting.
Senior Circuit Judge Nelson agreed with the majority's ruling that BSEE
acted appropriately when it approved the OSRPs in question, but dissented to
all other aspects of the majority opinion. Specifically, the dissent agreed with
Alaska Wilderness League's contention that BSEE's action was discretionary,
triggering an ESA consultation.
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's finding that BSEE was exempt from performing a NEPA analysis. The dissent did not agree with the
majority's interpretation of the NEPA exception. The dissent argued that as a
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regulator of environmental consequences "the [BSEE] did in fact possess the
kind of discretion that necessitated NEPA review."
WJarnes Tilton

ONRC Action v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 798 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
the Bureau of Reclamation because the two water sources at issue were not
"meaningfully distinct" and did not require the governmental entity to obtain a
permit under the Clean Water Act).
In 2012, ONRC Action, an Oregon-based environmental group, filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon contending that the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") discharged pollutants from
the Klanath Straits Drain ("KSD") into the Klamath River without a permit, in
violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Bureau filed a motion for
summary judgment and ONRC Action filed a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment. A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation in favor of
the Bureau because of the Water Transfers Rule, which the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") adopted through regulation. The district court
adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation finding summary judgment in favor of the Bureau and denying ONRC Action's motion for partial
summary judgment. ONRC Action appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Court").
In 1905, Congress authorized the Klamath Irigation Project ("Project") to
provide irrigation to approximately 210,000 acres of land in Oregon and California through a system of dams, pumps, drains, tunnels, and canals. The Project draws water from the Klamath River and Upper Klamath Lake, and eventually conveys the water from Lower Klamath Lake back into the Klamath River
through the KSD. In the early 20th Century a natural waterway called the Klamath Straits connected the Lower Klamath Lake and the Klamath River. A
local railroad severed the Klamath Straits in 1917, but the Bureau restored flow
in the 1940s when it created the KSD. The KSD includes two pumping stations
that keep water flowing within a certain operating range; however, the pumps
are not always active. The KSD generally follows the historic pathway of the
Klamath Straits, with only a slight deviation passing through marshland that
acted as a historical hydrological connection between the water bodies.
To resolve whether the district court correctly granted sununary judgment
in favor of the Bureau, the Court looked to recent Supreme Court precedent
in determining whether Lower Klamath Lake and Klamath River were "meaningfully distinct" water sources. The Court cited Los Angeles County Flood
Control Dist v. NaturalResources Defense Council ("L.A. County'), where
the Supreme Court held that pumping water between different parts of a water
body is not a discharge of pollutants under the CWA. The Supreme Court
went on to add that a water transfer is a discharge of pollutants only if the bodies
of water are "meaningfully distinct." As a result of the Supreme Court's holding
in L.A. County, the Court did not rule on whether the Water Transfers Rule

